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Abstract
Schopenhauer’s compassion (Mitleid) emphasises that a person participates immediately 
in another’s suffering. A pervasive theme among critics historically is that Schopenhauer 
engages in an unwitting reduction of compassion to some form of egoism. This article 
argues that a spatial-relational framework of understanding can support Schopenhauer’s 
compassion and defend it against the charges of egoism. This spatial-relational framework 
is drawn from a reinterpretation of a dimension of Lévi-Strauss’ observations on cross-cul-
tural structures of relation – diametric and concentric spatial projections – without need-
ing to endorse Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist commitments. A distinction between concentric 
spatial projections as assumed connection and diametric opposition as the ‘thick partition’ 
of assumed separation offers contrasting frames for understanding a relational self, in 
Schopenhauer’s Mitleid. The objections of critics, including Nietzsche, that Schopen-
hauer’s compassion is mere egoism, are criticisms due to the projection of a diametric 
spatial-relational structure of assumed separation onto Schopenhauer’s way of thinking. 
Schopenhauer’s distinctive conception of compassion adopts an implicit concentric relation 
as assumed connection which challenges traditional diametric structured Western logic, 
the framework within which his critics are embedded. 
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Resum. Reconceptualitzar la ‘compassió’ de Schopenhauer a través d’estructures de relació 
espacialment concèntriques i diametrals 
La compassió de Schopenhauer (Mitleid) emfasitza que una persona participa immedia-
tament del sofriment d’una altra. Una de les qüestions que ha romàs al llarg de la història 
entre els crítics de Schopenhauer és la seva reducció inconscient de la compassió a una 
forma d’egoisme. Aquest article argumenta que una concepció de marc espacio-relacional 
manté la compassió de Schopenhauer contra les assumpcions egoistes. Aquest marc espa-
cio-relacional sorgeix d’una reinterpretació d’una part de les observacions de Lévi-Strauss 
en les estructures de relacions interculturals —en les projeccions diametrals i concèntri-
ques— sense que haguem de comprometre’ns amb els pressupòsits estructuralistes de 
Lévi-Strauss. Una distinció entre les projeccions espacials concèntriques suposadament 
connectades i el contrari diametral com a suposadament separat ens ofereix marcs contras-
tables per entendre el sí relacional del Mitleid de Schopenhauer. Les objeccions que han 
fet alguns crítics, entre ells Nietzsche, que la compassió de Schopenhauer és una forma 
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simple d’egoisme són degudes a la projecció d’una estructura espacio-relacional i diametral 
suposadament separada del pensament de Schopenhauer. La concepció schopenhaueriana 
de la compassió adopta una relació concèntrica suposadament connectada que qüestiona la 
lògica d’Occident, estructuralment diametral, el marc en el qual es mouen els seus crítics. 
Paraules clau: compassió; egoisme; espai concèntric; espai diametral; causalitat; si mateix; 
altre
1.  The reduction of Schopenhauer’s distinctive concept of compassion to 
egoism
The key dimension of compassion (Mitleid) in a shift from egoism is a core 
distinctive tenet of Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical corpus, including On 
The Basis of Morality and the Fourth Book of Schopenhauer’s main work, The 
World as Will and Representation. Schopenhauer treats compassion (Mitleid) 
and suffering as metaphysical states, which he distinguished from the psycho-
logical. It is important to emphasise, with Alexander Bobko (2001: 95), that 
compassion is not only central to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics but also to his 
view of an original experience of the moral. 
For Schopenhauer, each individual is an expression of will striving to fulfil 
its ultimate drive towards life. Schopenhauer broadly espouses much of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, emphasising key Kantian principles such as that ulti-
mately, space and time are exclusively subjective forms of our a priori intuition; 
while the world of representation is individuated spatio-temporally, the world 
as it is in itself lies ‘outside’ of space and time. Building on this Kantian edifice, 
for Schopenhauer, the thing in itself is “one” and is best described as “Will”. 
Ultimately, we are “one” with each other qua objectifications of Will; the 
compassionate person intuitively understands this, while the egoistic/malicious 
person does not. 
Against this backdrop, it is notable that with regard to compassion, 
Schopenhauer directly contradicts Kant who treats feeling of compassion as a 
weakness (WWRI: 402). Schopenhauer is not seeking a universal Kantian 
formula for duty, he explicitly rejects search for an unconditional ought for 
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morality offering instead his pivotal notion of compassion. In doing so, he is 
shifting the key domain of relevance for morality away from “abstract cogni-
tion” (WWRI: 395) and towards experience of compassion. Moreover, 
Schopenhauer’s view of the metaphysical is a distinctive one which treats the 
metaphysical as being central to experience. For Schopenhauer, experience of 
suffering is a key to recognition of the ‘world’. Schopenhauer’s link between 
metaphysics and experience is a break with traditional conceptions of ration-
alistic, a priori metaphysics, diverging here from Kant and providing an ances-
try for Husserl.  
Schopenhauer’s thematising of compassion describes a central feature as, 
“the immediate participation…primarily in the suffering of another…” 
(1839/1995: 144/208f.). He continues: 
As soon as this compassion is aroused, the weal and woe of another are nearest 
to my heart in exactly the same way, although not always in exactly the same 
degree, as otherwise only my own are. Hence the difference between him and 
me is now no longer absolute (1839/1995: 144/208f.). 
The kernel of Schopenhauer’s analysis of compassion is that a person par-
ticipates immediately in another’s suffering. 
As David E. Cartwright (2008) notes, a pervasive theme among critics his-
torically, including Johann August Becker, Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Scheler, 
is that Schopenhauer engages in an unwitting reduction of compassion to some 
form of egoism. In Julian Young’s words, such compassion is in the interests of 
his “metaphysical rather than his empirical self” so that the person becomes a 
“metaphysical egoist” (2005: 182f.). Young’s framing of the question in terms of 
a metaphysical self already runs into a conflict with Schopenhauer, as for 
Schopenhauer if one means by metaphysical self, one’s substance as the will 
that underlies everything, then there is no personality or self involved at all, 
since individuality is completely dissolved at the basic metaphysical level. The 
key aspect of Young’s critique at issue here is his characterisation of compassion, 
echoing Nietzsche, in terms of reduction merely to egoism.
This article will argue that a spatial-relational framework of understand-
ing can support Schopenhauer’s conception of compassion and defend it 
against the charges of egoism. This spatial-relational framework is drawn 
from a reinterpretation of a dimension of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ observations 
on spatial structures of relation, without needing to endorse Lévi-Strauss’ 
structuralist commitments. 
Nietzsche’s criticisms of Schopenhauer’s Mitleid refer to, “the follies of the 
compassionate” (1883-5/1954: 114). He asks, “Why double your ‘ego’ !…to 
view and imbibe the experiences of others as if they were ours”, as is the 
“demand of a philosophy” of Mitleid. With characteristic bombast, he con-
cludes, “this would destroy us” (Nietzsche, 1881/1982, §137). For current 
purposes, it is Nietzsche’s framing of compassion as a doubling of the ego that 
is at issue. Challenge here to Nietzsche’s view of compassion as an accentuation 
of the ego does not focus on other criticisms of compassion given by Nietzsche 
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in terms of its lack of utility,1 its expression of a slave morality viewed as per-
vading Judaeo-Christian traditions or how compassion may mask power rela-
tions. Some commentators have raised concerns as to whether the focus of 
critique of Nietzsche on Schopenhauer’s Mitleid was on pity rather than com-
passion (see Janaway, 2007, for an account of this issue). For current purposes, 
the focus is on Mitleid as compassion, as understood by Schopenhauer.
Envisaging compassion as a doubling of the ego, Nietzsche struggles to 
envisage a stable conception of self, or relation between self and other, that is 
not locked into either a rigid binary opposition between self and other – or 
into a monism where self is reduced to other, or other is reduced to self. This 
position of Nietzsche in contrast with Schopenhauer will now be examined in 
spatial-relational terms as two contrasting projected structures of relation with 
regarding to understanding of Mitleid.
2.  Diametric and concentric projected spatial structures of relation: 
Assumed separation and assumed connection
Lévi-Strauss (1963) cites a range of cross-cultural examples of diametric and 
concentric spatial opposition observed by different anthropologists. A diamet-
ric spatial structure is one where a circle is split in half by a line which is its 
diameter, or where a square or rectangle is similarly divided into two equal 
halves (see Fig. 1). In a concentric spatial structure, one circle is inscribed in 
1. See Christopher Janaway (2007) for an account of these objections of Nietzsche, including 
a view in Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, that by placing compassion for suffering as key 
to morality, Schopenhauer gives preference to what is passive and vulnerable in people, 
rather than human’s strength and creativity. For an account of advantages of compassion, 
see Ursula Wolf (2015).
Figure 1. Diametric Dualism.
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another larger circle (or square); in pure form, the circles share a common 
central point (see Fig. 2).
A purportedly key distinguishing feature of concentric and diametric struc-
tures, observed by Lévi-Strauss, is that they tend to co-exist in “functional rela-
tion” (1973: 73) and not simply in isolation. They are spatial structures of re -
lation as part of a system of relations. Being mutually interactive, at least 
potentially, they are observed as structures of relation but also structures in rela-
tion. Lévi-Strauss recognises that they are fundamentally interlinked, so that an 
increase in one is compensated for by a decrease in the other; they coexist in 
dynamic tension. Meaning is in their contrasting relative differences, rather than 
in either space considered in isolated, absolute atomistic or essentialist terms. 
Lévi-Strauss opened up a discourse of relation between concentric and diametric 
structures, without apprehending the potentially wider scope of this spatial dis-
course, as it becomes transferred to other contexts of relation.
It was in the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, in his cross-cultural 
accounts of social structures or mythological systems, where dynamic relations 
of contrast between concentric and diametric structures of relation began to 
be made more explicit. However, Lévi-Strauss did not realise the full potential 
of his spatial insights or interrogate the transferability of these dynamic dia-
metric and concentric spaces to other kinds of systems of relation. He tended 
to treat diametric and concentric modes as structures and underemphasised 
their features as spaces.
A claim is not being made that the entailments of the relational differenc-
es between concentric and diametric spaces are qualities that are in some way 
essential or intrinsic to either structure, considered as individual isolated struc-
Figure 2. Concentric Dualism.
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tures, abstracted from the context of their mutual relation.2 A key relative 
difference, overlooked by Lévi-Strauss’s empiricism, is nevertheless, ascertain-
able in principle. It is that the inner and outer poles of concentric dualism are 
fundamentally attached to each other, unlike in diametric dualism. It is a 
self-evident entailment of concentric relation that both concentric poles coex-
ist in the same space, and thus, the outer circle overlaps the space of the inner 
one; the outer circle surrounds and contains the inner circle. The opposite that 
is within the outer circle or shape cannot detach itself from being within this 
outer shape. Notwithstanding that the outer circle or shape can move in the 
direction of greater detachment from the inner circle, it cannot, in principle, 
fully detach itself from the inner circle in concentric relation (even if the inner 
circle becomes an increasingly smaller proportion of the outer). Full detach-
ment could conceivably occur only through destroying or altering the form of 
the other pole. It can be concluded that full detachment could occur only 
through destroying the very concentric nature of the whole opposition itself. 
In contradistinction, in diametric dualism both oppositional realms are 
basically detached and can be further smoothly detached from the other. 
These conclusions operate for both spaces, whether they are viewed as being 
two-dimensional, or three-dimensional. A concentric structure assumes con-
nection between its parts and any separation is on the basis of assumed 
connec tion, whereas a diametric structure assumes separation and any connec-
tion between the parts is on the basis of this assumed separation. As structures 
in relational difference, this contrast is a relativistic one of degree (Downes, 
2012, 2013). Concentric and diametric spaces thus can be seen to offer con-
trasting structures of differential relation. A concentric spatial relation is a 
structure of inclusion compared to a diametric spatial structure of exclusion. 
In Gaston Bachelard’s words, pertinent to diametric space, “simple geometrical 
opposition becomes tinged with aggressivity” (1964: 212).
A Japanese cultural context illustrates the entwinement between the spatial 
and the relational. Masayoshi Morioka suggests that “the idea of inside/outside 
is not only a radical essential category of cultural characteristics, but [is] also 
universal” (2007: 193), citing Kimura’s (2005) emphasis that the Japanese 
words uchi (inside) and soto (outside) express a characteristic cultural ethos, 
where uchi (inside) is exactly equal to that of one’s family or group. Yet a dia-
metric outsideness is an assumed separation that is radically different from the 
assumed con nection of the outside pole to the inner pole of concentric space. 
Inner and outer need not necessarily be diametrically framed but may also be 
concentrically framed. The Japanese concept of ma can signify the space 
2. A number of entailments of the relative differences between concentric and diametric spac-
es are examined in Downes (2012, 2013, 2015). These include contrasts not only between 
i) assumed separation (diametric space) and assumed connection (concentric space), but 
also ii) symmetry as mirror image inversion (diametric space) and symmetry as unity (con-
centric space) and iii) relative closure from background (diametric space) compared with 
relative openness to background (concentric space). For current purposes, focus will be on 
i). Only the latter two entailments were recognised by Lévi-Strauss.
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between one thing and another and can also be used for understanding of 
human relationships (Morioka, 2007). Concentric and diametric spatial struc-
tures of relation invite application to relations between self and other, thereby 
entwining the spatial and relational, as with the Japanese concept ma.
These ancient cross-cultural concentric and diametric structures of relation 
in relation share with language the feature of being a transsubjective system of 
relations. However, as a discourse of implication, this does not make these 
projected spatial structures reducible to a linguistic system. The examination 
of them here is to develop a position beyond Lévi-Strauss, rather than simply 
echoing his fundamental assumptions. For example, the relational difference 
between the assumed connection of concentric space and the assumed separa-
tion of diametric opposition need not be subsumed by the Procrustean force 
of a claimed commitment of Lévi-Strauss to Cartesian mental structures, noted 
by Eugene D’Aquili (1975). It may have been these very commitments to rigid 
Cartesian dichotomies which led to Lévi-Strauss overlooking the key entail-
ment that concentric relation challenges such dichotomies and is more con-
nective than diametric relation.
It is important to emphasise that Lévi-Strauss’s account of diverse empirical 
observations of concentric and diametric spatial structures is but one small part 
of his structural anthropological project, and it is to be recognised that his 
project is open to a number of criticisms (Downes, 2013); the argument here 
is not one which requires commitment to accepting other aspects of Lévi-
Strauss’s work
3.  Compassion as concentric projected spatial structures of relation  
in contrast to egoism as diametric space 
The problem of transcending egoism in Mitleid is one of finding a relation of 
assumed connection between self and other, which does not reduce one to the 
other; it is a challenge to traditional conceptions of an individual, self-con-
tained self. Schopenhauer needs a raft to rescue a conception of self in com-
passion, which does not confuse self with other; concentric relational space of 
assumed connection moving from diametric oppositional space supplies this 
raft. Schopenhauer rejects the charge of Cassina that a person with compassion 
is “deceived”, stating that, “it is precisely in his person, not in ours, that we feel 
the suffering, to our sorrow. We suffer with him and hence in him; we feel his 
pain as his, and do not imagine that it is ours” (1839/1995: 144/208f ). 
Schopenhauer postulates a mode of being-with or being-in, which does not 
reduce self and other to a monistic relation, where one becomes the other. 
This distinction between concentric spatialisation, as separation on the 
basis of assumed connection, and diametric opposition as assumed separation, 
can be directly uncovered from assumptions underlying a relational self, and 
relations between self and other, in Schopenhauer’s Mitleid. The objections of 
Nietzsche et al. that Schopenhauer’s description of compassion as, “the imme-
diate participation …primarily in the suffering of another…” (1839/1995: 
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144/208f ) is mere egoism, are criticisms due to the projection of a diametric 
structure of relation onto Schopenhauer’s way of thinking. It is the eschewal 
of monolithic projections of diametric structures of opposition that is at issue. 
Schopenhauer’s following words on Mitleid can be reinterpreted in terms 
of offering an implicit model of concentric relation – of separation being on 
the basis of assumed connection between self and other – thereby leading to a 
path for rebuttal of the charge of egoism:
As soon as this compassion is aroused, the weal and woe of another are nearest 
to my heart in exactly the same way, although not always in exactly the same 
degree, as otherwise only my own are. Hence the difference between him and 
me is now no longer absolute (1839/1995: 144/208f ).
As a common structural ‘way’ of assumed connection, the inner concentric 
circle is ‘near’ to the outer circle, while a degree of distance is maintained. 
Concentric spatialisation of relation resists collapse into a monistic fusion of 
identity, where the ego would assimilate the other’s identity to its own. Fur-
thermore, the dominion of this diametric structured mode of assumed separa-
tion, bringing an ‘absolute’ difference between self and other, is threatened by 
this mode of compassion, summoning a restructuring into concentric frames 
for experience. Concentric spatialisation expresses a conjoined relation between 
its mutually entwined poles to buttress the description of compassion of 
Schopenhauer as, “We suffer with him and hence in him” (1839/1995: 
147/211f ). The concentric poles are ‘in’ one another and at a level of assumed 
connection ‘with’ the other. Compassion encounters the other in this structur-
al sense as a relational state expressed through concentric space as assumed 
connection.
Compassion internalises the other as an extension of the self. This is a 
distinctive spatial-relational understanding of concentric assumed connection, 
where the inner circle of self extends to a second surrounding circle of the 
other. A different spatial structure of relation founds egoism, namely, a dia-
metric oppositional spatial split between self and other, where the individual 
internalises the other with stark divisive boundaries of a diametric dualistic 
spatial relation.
Without having to accept crude labels of good and bad attributed in an 
essentialist manner to individuals, and recognising that Schopenhauer treats 
conceptions of good and bad as relative to the will,3 Schopenhauer’s wider point 
about different kinds of boundaries between self and other offers a key insight:
The bad man everywhere feels a thick partition between himself and everything 
outside him…The good character, on the other hand, lives in an external world 
that is homogenous with his own true being. The others are not non-I for him, 
but an ‘I once more’” (OBM: 211). 
3. “This concept [of good] is essentially relative, and designates the suitability of an object to any 
particular effort of the will. So anything that is agreeable to the will in any one of its expressions, 
that is conducive to its purpose, is intended in the concept of good…” (WWRI: 387).
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This ‘thick partition’ of a diametric space of assumed separation contrasts 
with an assumed connection of common structure of relation to self and other 
in concentric relation; concentric relation treats the other as an extension of 
self rather that being a diametric split non-I from self. In a concentric relation 
of assumed connection, Schopenhauer’s words are apposite, “the suffering he 
sees in others affects him almost as much as his own…he makes less of a dis-
tinction than is usually made between himself and others” (WWRI: 399, italics 
in original). This domain of relevance of modes of distinction for Schopen-
hauer, as differentiating membranes between self and other, can be directly 
expressed in spatial structural terms of concentric spatial relations to contrast 
with diametric spatial oppositions.
The rigid boundaries of division from other in egoism is again firmly 
expressed by Schopenhauer:
However densely the mind of someone evil is enveloped in the maya, i.e., how-
ever firmly he is caught in the principium individuationis, seeing his own person 
as utterly distinct and separated from everyone else by a wide gulf (cognition 
that he firmly embraces, because it is the only viewpoint that will serve and 
support his egoism…) (WWRI: 392). 
Such a split assumed separation of diametric space framing the relation 
between self and other is reiterated by Schopenhauer, referring to “the absolute 
barrier” (WWRI: 397) which is to “present him as completely distinct from 
other individuals and divide him from these others and the countless miseries 
they suffer” (WWRI: 392). Such a diametric spatial veil is treated by Schopen-
hauer as being, in effect, a “merely illusory nature of the principium individu-
ationis and the distinction it posits between himself and others” (WWRI: 393). 
This egoistic mode is again treated as an illusory separation, “the merely felt 
cognition of the illusoriness and the nothingness of the forms of representation 
that separate individuals” (WWRI: 393). Compassion overcomes this illusory 
diametric space between self and other to attune the person to a unitary will 
to life purportedly prior to space, time and causality. Compassion brings to an 
end, at least momentarily in the eternal present moment (as for Schopenhau-
er the past and future are illusory), the diametric spatial structures of egoism.
It is to be emphasised that a concentric relation is not a monistic relation of 
identity so that the person would be the ‘same’ as the other; rather, as with the 
two poles of a concentric relation, allowance is made for a separation, though 
this separation is on the basis of an assumed connection. Focus on concentric 
spatio-relational aspects recognises an assumed connection that is not an exci-
sion of boundaries; rather it is a rendering of more fluid connective boundaries 
(than diametric structured opposition) that, nevertheless, retain distinction.
Janaway states that “Many will agree with Nietzsche that the doctrines 
about the One Will and the illusoriness of the individual are an excess and a 
mystical embarrassment” (2007: 63). This spatial framework challenges such 
a view, especially regarding the illusory dimension of the diametric spatial ego 
(though it does not go as far as maintaining the position of Schopenhauer that 
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“the tormentor and tormented are one”, WWRI: 381). Rather than being mere 
“nonsense about compassion” as characterised by Nietzsche (GS: 99), Schopen-
hauer offers key distinctions about people’s capacities to make distinctions 
between self and other; these can be concretised through specific spatial struc-
tures of relation, where diametric space is restructured and gives way to a prior 
relation of assumed connection in concentric spatial relation. The illusoriness 
of diametric spatial relations is not an excess; the thick walls of division under-
pinning diametric space can be opened and made transparent and permeable 
through concentric spatial connection.
It is evident that Schopenhauerian compassion provides a challenge to tra-
ditional Western A/Non-A diametric oppositions founding binary logic and 
conceptions of relation between self and other in diametric, Janus-faced terms. 
Schopenhauer’s interest in Eastern culture, and notably Buddhism, is well-
known. Nietzsche, the self-styled antimoralist, even anti-Christ of Ecce Homo, 
the expounder of the antinomy between the Apollonian and Dionysian from 
The Birth of Tragedy onwards, is the propounder of diametric space in extremis.4 
Schopenhauer’s relational conception of compassion challenges traditional 
diametric structured Western logic, the framework within which his critics are 
embedded. His thought transcends this diametric structural mode of assumed 
separation between self and other. 
4. Diametric space as illusion and obstacle
Janaway states that “Schopenhauer carries ‘unselfing’ to an extreme metaphys-
ical pitch, where the self becomes both an illusion and an obstacle to true 
value” (2007: 58). It is to be noted that the lesser distinction between self and 
others as envisaged by Schopenhauer implies a continuity of self rather than 
simply being, as yet, a total selflessness of renunciation; on this reading, move-
ment from diametric to concentric space in compassion is an intermediate 
stage, a transitional mediating state, a step on the way towards total selflessness 
of becoming at one with the will in itself.5 While diametric space is both an 
illusory dimension considered from the vantage point of a prior experiential 
truth in concentric spatial relations of assumed connection, it is also an obsta-
cle as resistance to concentric space. It is important also to acknowledge that 
in concentric space the self is sustained within the unitary whole of its relation 
to the other; it is the inner concentric pole in assumed connection with the 
other pole of the other as a concentric involved relation. 
Concentric spatial relation is not an obliteration of self but a moistening 
of boundaries between self and other as a governing precondition for compas-
sion. It is a restructuring of the diametric space constituting ego relations in 
4. Nietzsche accepts in Ecce Homo that inversion is almost his métier; mirror image inversion 
is another feature of diametric space, identified by Lévi-Strauss (see also Downes, 2012, 
2013).
5. See also Janaway (2009a) on compassion as a step on the way to renunciation.
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the direction of concentric space. This restructuring is not so much an anni-
hilation of egoistic experience but can be interpreted as a dissolution of the 
egoistic diametric space into the concentric realm. It is notable that Lévi-
Strauss describes a difference between destruction and dissolving generally, 
which expresses a notion of inclusion in dissolving that is absent from sheer 
annihilation:
[…] I believe the ultimate goal of the human sciences to be not to constitute, 
but to dissolve man … I am not blind to the fact that the verb ‘dissolve’ does 
not in any way imply (but even excludes) the destruction of the constituents 
of the body sub jected to the action of another body. The solution of a solid 
into a liquid alters the disposition of its molecules. It also often provides an 
efficacious method of putting them by so that they can be recovered in case 
of need and their properties be better studied (1962: 247).
Shift from diametric structured oppositional space to concentric structured 
relational space of assumed connection involves a structural modification of 
the former but not its annihilation. It is to be recognised that at times 
Schopenhauer goes further than this ‘less of a distinction’, referring to aboli-
tion, “the barrier between the I and the non-I is for the moment abolished” 
(OBM: 166), rather than the lessening of distinction through the assumed 
connection of concentric spatial relations, where the inner circle of self 
embraces the outer circle of other in a restructuring from a diametric opposi-
tional split between self and other.
Compassion as renunciation or at least structural modification of ego is 
envisaged by Schopenhauer as part of a process of ‘turning away’, with a range 
of intermediate phases such as “voluntary renunciation, resignation, true com-
posure and complete will-lessness” (WWRI: 406).6 This passage offers implic-
it support for concentric spatial relations of assumed connection between self 
and other as a transitional space from egoism that compassion provides. Such 
concentric spatial relation does not necessarily offer succour for Schopenhau-
er’s further position of complete will-lessness in renunciation. However, it does 
support Schopenhauer’s shift away from abstract cognition7 through compas-
sion, where “the cognition that gives rise to the negation of the will is intuitive 
and not abstract” (WWRI: 410). 
The proposed spatial-relational shift for Schopenhauer’s compassion in a 
process of movement from the obstacle of diametric space (as splits of assumed 
separation) to concentric spatial relations of assumed connection requires some 
modification of Schopenhauer’s position. As a concentric spatial mode enter-
ing the movement from the realm of space, time and causality of empirical 
6. As Sandra Shapsay and Tristan Ferrell observe, “Schopenhauer’s system is in general char-
acterized by degrees (e.g., he talks of grades of the manifestation of the metaphysical will 
captured by the doctrine of the Ideas; grades of insight into the metaphysical reality – in 
aesthetic experience, compassion and resignation – and these correspond to degrees of 
will-lessness” (2015: 65).
7. See, for example, WWRI: 395-397.
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appearances, it is violating the excision of space from the realm of will as the 
Kantian Ding-an-Sich relied upon for Schopenhauer’s framework of metaphys-
ics. On the other hand, treated as a psychological more than metaphysical 
state, as a kind of intersubjective mode of relation, it moves compassion away 
from being exclusively in the realm of the unitary world of the will to life as a 
thing in itself. This latter movement is but a small step for Schopenhauer as 
he does at least in places imply recognition of compassion as existing in the 
phenomenal realm of appearances and cognition, “compassion is apparent in 
our heartfelt participation in the friend’s well-being and woe” (WWRI: 403), 
“cognition of other people’s suffering, which is immediately intelligible from 
one’s own suffering and the two are considered the same” (WWRI: 402). 
Schopenhauer is seeking a basic orientation of openness to contrast with ego-
ism, where a person “takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individ-
uals as he does in his own” and yet this goes further to include a capacity for 
a basic openness to suffering in life, to “take upon himself the pain of the 
whole world” (WWRI: 405). Concentric openness of assumed connection as 
a precondition for compassion is not only an interpersonal state of relation, it 
is a capacity for experience of an existential pain.
For Schopenhauer, will is the essence of the world and “the ultimate sub-
strate of every appearance” (1992: 47/34). In Arthur Hübscher’s words, 
Schopenhauer envisions the world as a will, which is unified, eternal and 
undivided, independent of space and time (‘einheitlich, ewig und ungeteilt, 
außerhalb von Raum und Zeit’) (1938: 15). In Schopenhauer’s Metaphysik der 
Natur, a number of kinds of affect as dimensions of will are adumbrated 
(Schreck, Freude, Schaam, Zorn, Furcht) – and Mitleid is a notable omission. 
Mitleid differs from “convulsions of the will” (“…Konvulsionen des Willens”) 
(1984: 75), and operates on a different level from the panoply of other affec-
tive states. Schopenhauer’s conception of metaphysics is imbued with experi-
ence of suffering [Leiden] as key to discovering the world as ‘will’. Sarah Rich-
mond observes the connotation of suffering within the German term, Mitleid, 
literally suffering-with, in contrast to Mitfreude, literally, rejoicing-with (2004: 
262). Richmond highlights that a dedicated term for empathy in English was 
a translation from the German Einfühlung, which itself is quite a recent 
socio-historical construct, coined only in the early twentieth century. Thus, 
the term ‘empathy’ was unavailable to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche for their 
discussions of Mitleid (compassion). Empathy requires an object, whereas 
compassion is a wider background concept as a relational state.
5.  Compassion within the determinism of the empirical world: 
Background conditions of space
Schopenhauer’s reliance on Kant’s Third Antinomy between freedom and cau-
sality, which places the phenomenal world under a mode of determinism with 
regard to the freedom of the noumenal will of Schopenhauer’s will to life 
invites the related question as to how compassion can exist in a determined 
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causal dimension to move from the diametric space of egoism. In On the Four-
fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Schopenhauer criticises Kant’s 
views on causality regarding inferences about succession with regard to empir-
ical senses and judgment (1813/2012:86) and on perception with regard to 
causality (1813/2012:79). Nevertheless, across his work, Schopenhauer’s under-
standing of freedom and causality holds firmly within the edifice of Kant’s 
Third Antinomy with a transcendental realm of freedom at the level of the in 
itself and causal determinism in the realm of appearances. As Schopenhauer 
operates within a strict Kantian framework of transcendental freedom for the 
will to life as the thing in itself and determinism for the empirical world of 
appearances, he is committed to a view that “The person is never free, even 
though it is an appearance of a free will, because it is the already determined 
appearance of the free willing of that will” (WWRI: 315). This raises the 
question of compassion with respect to freedom and causality. 
Compassion as a shift from diametric to concentric relational spaces must 
operate for Schopenhauer as a freedom through the will of the thing in itself, 
not through the diametric egoism of the phenomenal world as a cognitive 
choice as such. Though engaged cognitively with the suffering of the other 
person (WWRI: 402), compassion is precognitive and prerepresentational. 
Schopenhauer eschews mere intentionality for compassion, “The old doctrine 
is that he wills what he cognizes; I say he cognizes what he wills” (WWRI: 319); 
“entrance into freedom cannot be forced by any intention or resolution, but 
rather emerges from the innermost relation of cognition to willing in human 
beings” (WWRI: 432). Compassion is a metaphysical dimension, according 
to Schopenhauer. The question therefore arises as to how this spatial move-
ment – from diametric spatial experience of egoism to concentric relational 
space of compassion that dissolves the rigid boundaries between self and other 
– pertains to the world of determinism in appearances.
 A key starting point here is to recall Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the 
negative, whether for happiness, satisfaction and its relation to pain; the pain 
or lack is primary, and satisfaction is the overcoming of the lack (WWRI: 
345-346). This focus on change as a negation process can also be applied to 
causality, as a focus on negating or at least changing supporting background 
conditions to change causal processes. A key passage in The World as Will and 
Representation develops this point which requires further exposition:
The only time this freedom can manifest itself directly in appearance…is when 
it brings to an end the thing that appears; and because the mere appearance…
being a rung in the chain of causes, still continues to exist in time (which 
contains only appearances), it stands in contradiction to the will that mani-
fests itself through this appearance, since the will negates what the appearance 
expresses (WWRI: 430).
John Stuart Mill’s chal lenge to a clear cut distinction between causal and 
non-causal states can shed light on the above point of Schopenhauer. Mill 
states:
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It is seldom if ever between a consequent and a single antecedent that this 
invariable sequence subsists. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of 
several antecedents the concurrence of all of them being requisite to produce, 
that is, to be certain of being followed by the consequent (1872: 327). 
Mill noted that very often one antecedent is termed the cause, the other 
antecedents being conditions. Actions that impact causally have hidden con-
tingent conditions, without which the more obvious causal elements could 
not have occurred, just as striking a bil liard ball to hit another presupposes the 
condition of gravitation. Causes necessarily operate within a background of 
supporting conditions that are structured sources of the cause’s efficacy. 
With regard to a movement within causal determinism, an implication of 
this insight is that change to background supporting conditions may shift the 
whole causal trajectory of a system. This need not be a destructive phenome-
non, it may potentially be a constructive phenomenon, if the causal trajecto-
ries from the environment and egoism of the individual in space and time are 
destructive ones. In other words, a focus on changes to contingent or support-
ing background conditions may play a key role to undermine damaging caus-
al trajectories of egoism.
If the background precondition for egoism of diametric structured oppo-
sitional space can be modified towards fostering other background supporting 
conditions of concentric space, this offers a key avenue for compassion with-
in the deterministic empirical world of appearances. Diametric space can be 
brought to an end as a background condition for causal chains, to be replaced 
by a different background condition of concentric spatial relation. Schopen-
hauer’s words are apt here, “All that they can do is alter the direction of its 
striving, i.e., get the will to use a different path to search for the thing it 
invariably seeks” (WWRI: 321); concentric spatial relations is an altered direc-
tion of the striving of the diametric space of egoism, it is a structural modifi-
cation of this diametric spatial movement of projection through the relative 
tension between contrasting modes of assumed connection and assumed sep-
aration. The ‘rung in the chain of causes’ recognised by Schopenhauer is some-
what malleable through their background spatial preconditions supporting 
causal impacts in the phenomenal world. 
Concentric relational space of assumed connection framing experience of 
compassion is not itself a cognitive representation, at least not primarily. It is 
a precognitive, prerepresentational, taken for granted background mode of 
relation. This article has situated it as a mediating dimension between the 
empirical self of the principium individuationis and the will in itself in 
Schopenhaurian thought. Any further argument that concentric space is part 
of the Ding an Sich of the will to life, as a microcosm of a wider systemic 
macrocosm of concentric structured relations, is beyond the scope of this 
argument. Nevertheless, suffice to observe that the specific Kantian framework 
of Schopenhauer would exclude any spatial notion from the realm of the Ding 
an Sich.
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6. Compassion: A different kind of rationality
Janaway’s introduction to the Cambridge edition of The World as Will and Rep-
resentation, Volume I, characterises Schopenhauer’s position as a shift away from 
the rational with regard to morality, “The effective demotion of reason from any 
foundational role in characterizing human behaviour or explaining what has 
moral worth…[is one of the] notable distinguishing features of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy” (2010: xxiv). This arguably overstates Schopenhauer’s position for 
compassion, if not renunciation; Mitleid is a shift from the rationalistic and 
abstraction that is not to be equated with the irrational. It is a different kind of 
reason that integrates with the emotional and relational.8 
Schopenhauer’s compassion is not mere irrationalism but a shift from 
decontextualised abstraction to relation as a basis for morality, through shifting 
of spatial-relational boundaries between self and other. With his pivotal con-
ception of compassion, Schopenhauer is offering a different internalisation 
of the other from egoism. Compassion internalises the other as an extension of 
the self. This is a distinctive spatial-relational understanding of concentric 
assumed connection, where the inner circle of self extends to a second sur-
rounding circle of the other. A different spatial structure of relation founds 
egoism, namely, a diametric oppositional spatial split between self and other, 
where the individual internalises the other with stark divisive boundaries of a 
diametric dualistic spatial relation. 
It is notable that concentric space extends the self (inner circle) into 
assumed connection with the other (outer circle), which allows for distinction 
of identity of self, while recognising fundamental connection to another and 
to the world (background space itself to the two concentric poles). Compas-
sion is not egoism reformulated or doubled but a different kind of spatial-re-
lation of the internalised other to self. Altering the direction of causal trajec-
tories through change to malleable background spatial conditions as an 
interplay between diametric oppositional and concentric relational spaces, 
compassion can govern self-other relational frames, through modification of 
the diametric spatial precondition in the direction of concentric relational 
space for the internalisation of the other.
This argument has not sought to enter the terrain of justifying why com-
passion is preferable to egoism, but rather to offer a pathway towards under-
standing how compassion can exist without being reducible to egoism, 
through a spatial framework for internalisation of the other in relation. The 
longstanding criticisms of Schopenhauer’s conception of compassion (Mitleid) 
by critics that include Nietzsche, regarding compassion as basically egoism, 
8. See also Paul Downes’s (2012, 2015) reinterpretation of Carol Gilligan’s (1982) frames for 
moral reasoning in spatial-relational terms that challenge a logic of abstraction through 
a focus on an ethic of care. Compassion can be envisaged as a key background state of 
relation, as a trajectory guiding moral choices, through framing moral problems in terms 
of connection between self and other, as through examples of care, offered by Gilligan 
(1982).
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need to be understood as an example of a diametric structured spatial projec-
tion of understanding and relation to other. This diametric space of assumed 
separation between self and other is not the only possible projected spatial 
structure, beyond a reductive monism that does not distinguish at all between 
self and other. Schopenhauer’s account of compassion, across ample passages 
of text, highlights a preoccupation with a shift in relational boundaries 
between self and other, to overcome egoism through compassion. This shift 
can be understood as giving expression to a concentric spatial projection of 
understanding and relation, that lies in tension with a traditional Western A/
Non A diametric structured logic of exclusion.
Schopenhauer’s position on compassion is not only a highly tenable one 
against the backdrop of concentric relational space, it illustrates the distinc-
tiveness of Schopenhauer’s thought in challenging traditional Western taken 
for granted assumptions regarding relations between self and other – and in 
replacing abstract cognition of morality with a fundamental relational mode 
of compassion.
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